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Brown's *Ormond*

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“Government and Manners”

Cosmopolitanism and the “Spirit” of Liberal Democracy in *The Federalist* and Charles Brockden Brown’s *Ormond*

Abstract: This article attempts an interpretive reorientation toward Charles Brockden Brown’s gothic novel Ormond by examining the eighteenth-century political ideas it engages. Locating what I call, following Amanda Anderson, a “cosmopolitan ideal” at the core of democratic life, Ormond, I argue, registers the influence of both Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws and The Federalist on Brown’s thought concerning the relationship between political institutions and the “spirit”—the manners, customs, and practices—of a given people. Emphasizing these elements of the novel’s concern with the nature of political analysis and reflection in a democratic world constantly threatened by violence, danger, and deceit requires us, I contend, to reassess the role of Sophia Courtland in the novel. Far from the voice of a narrow conservatism that critics have long attacked, Sophia, when properly situated in her eighteenth-century context, emerges as the novel’s most astute analyst of the relationship between political ideas and the “spirit” that provides their motive force—a faculty that Ormond, following Montesquieu and Publius, suggests is necessary to the stability and survival of liberal democracy.

KEYWORDS: *Ormond*, democracy, cosmopolitanism, *The Federalist*, Montesquieu, history of political thought

From the computation of eclipses, I now betook myself to the study of man. My proficiency, when I allowed it to be seen, attracted great attention. Instead of adulation and gallantry, I was engaged in watching the conduct of states, and revolving the theories of politicians.

—Charles Brockden Brown, *Ormond*; or, *The Secret Witness*

When Martinette de Beauvais relates the story of her intellectual growth in chapter 20 of Charles Brockden Brown’s gothic novel *Ormond*;

or, *The Secret Witness* (1799), many readers are liable to view Martinette's turn away from the domestic world of "adulation and gallantry" to that of political thought as a singularly positive development. Having already born witness to the immense limitations placed on women in the eighteenth-century world of the novel, we can delight in the repeated references to Martinette's worldly interests in "the conduct of states" and "the theories of politicians" (153) and her "profound and critical" thoughts "on government and manners" (141). In fact, in the mysterious and often-violent atmosphere of Brown's gothic novel, characters who have *not* reflected on "government and manners," on "the principles and progress of human society" (26), or who have ignored what is "elementary and fundamental, in the constitution of man and of government" (193) tend to suffer for it.

The political preoccupations of a novel like *Ormond* necessarily encourage us to consider the very definition of *politics* that informs our interpretations of early American literature. Yet recent articulations of that definition within Americanist studies are likely to deflect us from appreciating the full content—and thus the full significance—of the political interests and insights that motivate a character like Martinette or a novel such as *Ormond*. For instance, in his recent call for a "looser" and "more porous" conception of "politics" ("Something Else" 419) than those typically employed by historians and political scientists, Russ Castronovo underscores "the importance of widening politics to cultural politics" so that "politics [becomes] inseparable from critique" (420). Like recent advocates of what Susan Wolfson and Marjorie Levinson have called "activist formalism" (Wolfson 2; Levinson 559) and other aesthetically oriented frameworks that can help further uncover the ideological "dimensions" of American literature (Weinstein and Looby 10, 29–30), Castronovo celebrates the fusion of aesthetic inquiry with cultural studies' long-running critique of liberal political ideologies that purportedly emphasize rational abstraction, self-interest, and political passivity.¹ There is a difference, he asserts, between "[c]aring *for* history"—the practice of "temple priests" eager to "maintain a cult of the past"—and "caring *about*" it. For Castronovo, the latter is a far more "imaginative act" ("Something Else" 425) because it aims to recover the "revolutionary possibility" (426) latent in early American literary texts, which a more traditional historicism, with its narrower conception of politics and concomitant concern *for* history, has "overlooked" (419).

It might be more accurate to say, however, that what has been over-

looked in studies of early American literature—particularly those preoccupied with categorizing texts or characters as either “revolutionary” or conservative—is the primacy of politics itself in the new Republic. As historian Sean Wilentz puts it, “new style[s] of history . . . have generally submerged the history of politics in the history of social change, reducing politics and democracy to by-products of various social forces without quite allowing the play of politics its importance” (xx). To emphasize “cultural politics,” as Castronovo recommends, similarly risks obscuring not just important differences between eighteenth- and twenty-first-century understandings of the term *culture* but also the complex relationship between “culture” and “politics” that Eric Slauter has recently highlighted within eighteenth-century thought.² “Does political form determine cultural life,” Slauter asks, “or is it the other way around?” (13). Such questions were central to national life in the 1780s and 1790s as writers and thinkers interrogated the nature of well-built political institutions in a country still trying to make sense of a new constitutional order. To focus on politics and political ideas—on, as *Ormond* has it, “the conduct of states,” “the theories of politicians,” and, perhaps most importantly, “the study of man”—is not, therefore, to worship the past at the expense of the present or to employ conservative practices and ideas to the exclusion of the revolutionary or the radical. Nor is it to ignore the impact of social, economic, or cultural forces. Rather, it is to revise our understanding of how individuals comprehended and negotiated their social world in the history and literature of the early Republic.

In what follows, I attempt such an interpretive reorientation toward Charles Brockden Brown’s gothic political novel by way of a more rigorous examination of the eighteenth-century political ideas with which it engages. I therefore aim to contribute to the “parameter shift” that W. M. Verhoeven has called for with respect to Brown’s fiction by exploring Brown’s “negotiations with eighteenth-century philosophical and historical thought” (29). Scholars of *Ormond* have frequently celebrated the progressive elements of the novel, particularly its communitarian elements and the radical spirit of Martinette, while deriding the “conservatism” of figures such as Sophia Courtland (Hedges 118; Levine 47; Stern 227; Barnard and Shapiro; Lewis). But such labels occlude the ways in which both Martinette and Sophia (along with other characters in the novel) embody aspects of a particular disposition—what I call, following Amanda Ander-

son, a “cosmopolitan ideal”—that Brown’s novel suggests is necessary to the stability and survival of democratic life.³ Oriented toward the goal of imaginatively traversing the intellectual space between the local and the remote and between the individual and the community, the cosmopolitan ideal of *Ormond* encapsulates the novel’s engagement with the nature of political analysis and reflection in a democratic world constantly threatened by violence, danger, and deceit.

Ormond’s embrace of a cosmopolitan ideal represents, I argue, the influence of two prominent eighteenth-century political thinkers on Brown—Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, and “Publius,” the collective persona of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay in *The Federalist*. What Garry Wills calls “Montesquieu’s sociology of political types” (37) made him the premiere eighteenth-century philosopher of comparative politics—or, we might say, of “government and manners” (Brown, *Ormond* 141). His seminal study, *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748), is a wide-ranging and inherently cosmopolitan examination of the relationship between various political systems and the habits, practices, and customs of the societies living under them. We see this intellectual framework, and Montesquieu’s more general impetus toward attentive social and political analysis, represented not just in the “observations, on government and manners” (Brown, *Ormond* 141) of Martinette, but, more importantly, if more subtly, in the figure of Sophia Courtland, who I argue represents the novel’s most astute analyst of the relationship between political ideas and the “spirit” that provides their motive force. Of course, Montesquieu’s ideas had a profound influence on the political thought of Publius, and *The Federalist* offers a similarly wide-ranging comparative study of history and politics for the benefit of a newly formed republic. And while Publius departs from Montesquieu’s theory that a republican system could only work for small, homogenous nations (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 119–20), *The Federalist* nevertheless grounds its defense of democratic government for a large and diverse nation on the same capacity for comparative political analysis and reflection—for transcending the local in order to consider more “general or remote considerations” (106)—that informs the method of political analysis employed in *The Spirit of the Laws*.

What therefore links the political treatises of Montesquieu and Publius with the gothic narrative of *Ormond* is the idea that the “spirit” of democracy and the soundness of its institutions demand a particular *disposition*—

specifically, the cultivation of a cosmopolitan ideal—among its citizens. Without the ability to navigate the complex relationships between the local and the more general in political life, and absent the capacity for considering—in the language of *Ormond*—what is “elementary and fundamental, in the constitution of man and of government” (Brown, *Ormond* 193), fostering a democratic polity would, in the minds of Montesquieu, Publius, and Brown, likely prove futile. As I hope to demonstrate, *Ormond*’s wide-ranging engagement with the differences between life in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere represents more than a superficial comparison between the American and French Revolutions or between revolutionary and “counterrevolutionary” (Barnard and Shapiro xli–xlv; Levine 40) energies, but, rather, represents an extended examination of the way in which particular habits, attitudes, and manners inform the principles of government and the “spirit” of political life.

To place such political importance on the habits and deliberations of the democratic citizen may seem overly individualistic—a mischaracterization I will take up in more detail below. But as Amanda Anderson and Sandra Gustafson have recently argued, literary scholars have paid too little attention to the liberal tradition and its emphasis on the individual (Anderson) and the patently deliberative elements of early US political thought and writing (Gustafson).⁴ By recovering the important intellectual links between Montesquieu, Publius, and Brown, all of whom positioned individual security and human flourishing at the center of their political thought—and, in doing so, sought to connect the abstract nature of political ideas with the lived reality of everyday existence—I hope to contribute to this reassessment of how we interpret early American literature and the ways in which it imagined citizenship and social life in a liberal democracy. These important links and the capacious ideas about democratic politics that they reveal in our literary and intellectual tradition can only emerge into view, I argue, when we both care for *and* care about history.

POLITICS, FEAR, AND COSMOPOLITANISM IN
THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS AND THE FEDERALIST

A quick survey of the first ten essays in *The Federalist*, all of which deal with the insufficiency of the Articles of Confederation, reveals a marked preoccupation with the dangers, fears, violence, and passions existing in

the newly formed nation. As Publius saw it, the Articles of Confederation had produced a government that was not sufficiently national and thus had done little to combat the potent threats of political fracture, instability, and armed conflict—concerns that were shared by both Federalists like Hamilton, Madison, and Jay *and* their so-called Anti-Federalist opponents. In fact, as David J. Siemers demonstrates, the “massive uncertainty” (xvii) of the founding era and the widespread fear of chaos and violence convinced the Anti-Federalists to acquiesce in the Constitution’s ratification, for “[a]n underlying consensus that the rule of law was tenuous and must be upheld helped preserve an uneasy unity after ratification, as did the acknowledgment that reforms were desperately needed” (15). Yet this historical picture, Siemers argues, only comes into view when we take seriously the era’s fears about violence and political fracture and incorporate them into an adequate conception of “politics”:

A more realistic grasp of the politics of the era (*I am tempted to say of politics itself*) can only be attained if the uncertainty and even fear that motivated politicians and citizens on all sides are readily acknowledged. Undoubtedly John Locke and the English Whig opposition inspired the text of the founding; but Thomas Hobbes provided an unacknowledged subtext. (xvii; emphasis added)

Hobbes, whose greatest work of political philosophy, *Leviathan* (1651), was informed by—and composed amid—the English Civil War, is indeed a fitting “subtext” in a newly formed American nation terrified by the prospect of civil discord, though, as Paul Downes has recently demonstrated, Hobbes’s role in the tradition of eighteenth-century political thought was more often that of “a feared or unrecognized interlocutor” (4) who needed to be kept at bay.⁵

But it was Hobbes’s famous respondent, Montesquieu, whose influence on the Constitution and the debates surrounding it was even more pronounced.⁶ Like Hobbes, Montesquieu believed that fear was an important reason for forming political societies, though his conception of its exact role differed from Hobbes in important ways. For Montesquieu, the “weakness” of human beings in the state of nature leads to their “timidity” (6), “but the marks of mutual fear,” he argues, “would soon persuade them to approach one another,” thereby fulfilling a seemingly primary “desire to live in society” (*Spirit* 6–7). Despite that desire, ongoing peaceful coexis-

tence required “the establishment of laws among men” (7), and, in his famous dictum, he implores that governments must be organized “such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen” (157).

But what kind of government did this entail? For Montesquieu, the answer depended on the particular society one was examining. The relationship between the habits and customs of particular societies and their governing institutions was Montesquieu’s central, and most influential, concern. Hence Madison, writing about the rationale behind the newly formed US Constitution, writes in *Federalist* 39:

The first question that offers itself is whether the general form and aspect of the [proposed] government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. (254)

Madison here draws directly on Montesquieu’s seminal idea, expressed in *The Spirit of the Laws*, that the laws of a nation must be “appropriate to the people for whom they are made.” That is, they cannot be enforced from some distant and detached perspective of human life, but “must relate to the nature and the principle of the government that is established or that one wants to establish” (Montesquieu, *Spirit* 8). Montesquieu here distinguishes between the “nature” of a government — “that which makes it what it is” — and its “principle” — that is, “the human passions that set it in motion” (21). Those passions, for Montesquieu, were woven into the particular manners, mores, history, and customs (see 9, 310) of a given people and therefore entailed that society’s “spirit.” If a nation’s laws were at odds with its spirit, or vice versa, political stability could not long endure.

It is important to note that this kind of political sociology was, in the eighteenth century, inherently reformist and progressive in spirit. As Peter Gay argues, “it was a science designed to advance freedom and humanity” (323) through a patient, tolerant attention to the world’s inherent diversity (321–22). Amid that diversity, for Montesquieu, lay principles that allowed for the comparative examination of different forms of government, and thus a better sense of their respective natures. For democratic republics, the governing principle, in Montesquieu’s mind, was virtue, which he de-

finer as “love of the republic” (*Spirit* 42), which is “love of democracy” and, consequently, “love of equality” (43). Such a spirit is opposed to that of “monarchies and despotic states” where “no one aspires to equality,” only “superiority” (44). Note that Montesquieu is *not* saying that a democratic citizen is, by nature, an inherently more virtuous person than, say, a monarchical subject. Rather, he means that the mechanisms that inform the daily life of an individual in democratic republics are premised on neither the desire for individual recognition that is the spirit of monarchies (26) nor the “fear” that governs life under despotic governments (28), but a widespread and deeply felt commitment to the political community for the sake of itself. Virtue exists in all societies; but it must, of necessity, play a more substantial role in republics in order to keep them from devolving into violence and strife.

When Madison therefore speaks of “that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom,” he is speaking of the “spirit” that will “set . . . in motion” the form of government in the United States. For him, “no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people,” by which he means the republican citizen’s commitment to democratic ideas, woven, as they are, into the manners, mores, and practices that existed before the Constitution (see Wills 179–80, 185). Of course, the inherent problem for Publius is how to reconcile Montesquieu’s notion of an underlying republican “spirit,” which the latter believed could only exist in nations that were geographically small and culturally homogenous, with the larger and more diverse nature of life in the United States.

Eric Slauter and Edward Cahill have recovered for literary studies the important links between refined political judgment and aesthetic “taste” in eighteenth-century political thought—links that register in *The Federalist*’s attempts to synthesize the diversity of the US polity with the need for political agreement by turning to the idea of political representation (Slauter 123–66; Cahill 138–63). But another rhetorical component of that synthesis is Publius’s pronounced emphasis on *space* in his guiding tropes. Concerned about the prominence of a “local spirit” (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 299) in US life and the notion “that momentary passions, and immediate interests, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than *general or remote considerations* of policy, utility, [and] justice” (106; emphasis added), Publius, we might say, “maps” the imaginative distance between the “local” and the “remote” that the democratic

individual must explore and survey.⁷ Madison enhances the point in *Federalist* 10 when he argues that "the public views" must not only be (aesthetically) "refine[d]" but also (spatially) "enlarge[d]" to take in a greater variety of perspectives from the expansive geography of the nation (126). In fact, Madison's famous proposal for solving the problem of faction is to "[e]xtend the sphere" (127; emphasis added) of political opinions and perspectives—an image whose odd tension between two ("extend") and three dimensionality ("sphere") seems to inscribe a global imaginary into the political "space" of the nation as Madison links reflective assiduity with measures of distance.

These intimations of a global imaginary thus invoke a rhetoric of cosmopolitanism that fuses the local and the remote in a complex dialectic of reflective comparison and judgment. Scholars have recently rehabilitated a notion of cosmopolitanism that, in European thought of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was an important component of—not antithesis to—national thought (Anderson, *Powers*; Appiah; Wohlgemut), and Gregg Crane has demonstrated the presence of an "incipient" (19) or "nascent cosmopolitanism" (30) in US political thought of the founding era, including that of *The Federalist* (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 31–32).

Yet I suggest that the cosmopolitan ideal of *The Federalist*, rather than simply "incipient" or "nascent," is of paramount importance for securing democracy amid a vast and diverse country with a federalist constitution that requires the constant adjudication between state and national interests. What Amanda Anderson refers to as the cosmopolitan "ideal" helps elucidate the way in which Publius imagined democratic individuals negotiating the various horizons of experience between the local and the remote in the geographically large and culturally diverse world of the early Republic.⁸ While, according to Anderson, the cosmopolitan ideal "endorses reflective distance from one's cultural affiliations, a broad understanding of other cultures and customs, and belief in universal humanity" (*Way We Argue* 72), it is best understood as operating in the space *between* the local and the universal and therefore represents "a complex dialectic of detachment and engagement" (Anderson, *Powers* 17). As Esther Wohlgemut puts it, cosmopolitanism is "something 'rooted,' something 'grounded' in the local, the particular" (9) while simultaneously encouraging expansive reflection (see also Appiah xvi–xvii). As a result, it describes a dynamic of political life that goes beyond the notion of aesthetic taste, which tends to

privilege detached and general views without necessarily connecting them to the local and the particular.

In other words, the very dynamic that enabled the reflective examination of a country's relation to the world (exhibited in both Publius's and Montesquieu's wide-ranging engagement with world political history) is what Publius saw as a model for negotiating the diversity of habits and practices *within* the United States. And like the rhetoric of aesthetic perception it both complements and extends in *The Federalist*, a cosmopolitan spirit is inherently related to perception and judgment, and therefore emphasizes the role of the individual. "Cosmopolitanism," writes Anderson, "invites a description from the perspective of the participant as he or she negotiates a dense array of affiliations and commitments" (*Way We Argue* 80), which therefore "places cosmopolitanism closer to liberalism than to the radical traditions of critique" (87) that have influenced literary theory. For Publius, a more perfect union and a more stable democracy could only endure if each citizen's capacities for individual reflection and collective deliberation were properly secured and cultivated.

Of course, as in the idea of a cultivated aesthetic judgment, there is "a complex tension between elitism and egalitarianism" (Anderson, *Way We Argue* 73) woven into the cosmopolitan ideal, a tension that *The Federalist* attempts to reconcile by emphasizing both "a chosen body of [elected] citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country" (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 126), and a broad reliance on the capacities of the individual citizen to scrutinize and judge those elected citizens. To be "virtuous" for Publius thus did not mean to submit passively to the "refined" views of an elected elite or to subordinate one's interest to a vague, preconceived "republican" conception of the public good, but to participate in the "honorable determination" of what the public good even is.⁹

For Publius, those acts of honorable determination require the exercise of a cosmopolitan ideal that keeps the local *and* the remote, the individual *and* the community in view without thoroughly subordinating one to the other, thus revealing the liberal dimensions of US democracy, which locate the imaginative energies of the individual at the core of democratic experience. "Not the expectation that political life will be an arena of selflessness," writes David Epstein, "but the attractiveness of political life as an occasion for an *honorable self-assertion* underlies *The Federalist's* defense of republican government" (124; emphasis added). To act politically is not

to subordinate the self, but to acknowledge its ethical—and not simply its economic—centrality. Of course, it goes without saying that, in the late eighteenth century, there were many individuals who lacked the rights and protections necessary to assert themselves in any kind of comprehensive way, undermining the spirit of equality at the heart of democratic republics. But this should not keep us from analyzing the foundation of democratic thought in the United States, tarnished as it certainly is with disturbingly undemocratic elements.¹⁰

The result of the ongoing debates over the public good and the Constitution in the 1780s and 1790s meant that, as David Siemers describes it, “There simply could be no definitive answer about how the Constitution worked or whether it was salutary—until after its implementation. In early 1789 no one was in a position to predict what the new government sanctioned. Perhaps no one was even capable of definitively interpreting what had happened during the last two years” (18). That interpretive project would continue, creating much more continuity between the ratification debates and the political situation of the 1790s—an extended period Siemers calls “constitutional time”—than is often acknowledged (137). Such a revised historical framework therefore lends new meaning to William Hedges’s classic insight on Charles Brockden Brown: “Immediately behind Brown’s work lie the tensions of the 1790’s, *the period of testing the new Constitution*” (113; emphasis added). In *Ormond*, Brown’s own reliance on a cosmopolitan ideal—invoked, in part, in the novel’s spatial tropes but also in characters such as Martinette and, as we will see, Sophia Courtland and Ormond, himself—offers a distinct challenge to the exclusionary nature of life in the early Republic that *The Federalist* tends to gloss over while also considering the important relationship between “government and manners,” both in the United States and in the broader political world.

“SOCIETY AND MANNERS CONSTITUTE YOUR
FAVORITE STUDY”: MONTESQUIEU AND THE
COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL IN *ORMOND*

In the early scenes of *Ormond*, a yellow fever epidemic ravages the city of Philadelphia, particularly the poor, who do not have the luxury of leaving the city. Stephen Dudley and his daughter, Constantia, are among

the unfortunate who remain trapped within the city, their dire financial straits the result of a confidence man and counterfeiter named Craig who embezzled Dudley's fortune. Yet despite these precarious circumstances, Constantia continues her morning ritual "to rise with the dawn, and traverse, for an hour, the State-house Mall" (34)—that is, Independence Hall, the building in which the Declaration of Independence was signed and the US Constitution drafted. In other words, in the midst of the social turmoil that characterized life in "constitutional time," Constantia begins each day with a symbolic return to the location of the polity's literal origin—just one example of the way in which the institutional and philosophical foundations of political and social life always hover on the periphery of Brown's novel.¹¹

On the particular morning in question, Constantia observes the scene surrounding her and "ponder[s] with astonishment on the present situation of the city. The air was bright and pure, and apparently salubrious. Security and silence seemed to hover over the scene" (34). Yet appearances are deceiving since the epidemic will soon "increase[e] with portentous rapidity" (44). *Ormond; or, The Secret Witness* thus raises, early on, one of the novel's central motifs, one that it shares with both *The Federalist* and *The Spirit of the Laws*: the quest for individual safety and political security in a world permeated by dangers near and far, seen and unseen. And in a novel of counterfeiters and "secret witnessing"—not to mention widespread "negligence and knavery" (23)—the notion of perception is both paramount and, as we see with Constantia's social analysis, problematic. In the nation's makeshift capital, on the very grounds that brought forth that nation's founding documents and political institutions, the importance of accurate interpretation for achieving safety and security are fused into a narrative that highlights the immense difficulty of achieving either.

As we saw earlier with Martinette de Beauvais, whose "observations, on government and manners, were profound and critical" (141), Brown places a marked emphasis on attending to the relationship between political ideas and social practices—a disposition informed, I argue, by the work of Montesquieu. As W. M. Verhoeven has demonstrated, Brown's letters and journal entries reveal that "the writings of a whole string of French Enlightenment thinkers exerted a significant influence on Brown's ideas, including Montesquieu, Helvétius, Holbach, D'Alembert, Buffon, Fénelon, Voltaire,

La Rochefoucauld, and Condorcet”—thinkers whom Brown encountered in the early 1790s before the work of William Godwin, whose influence on Brown has been widely remarked upon (18). Though references to Montesquieu are not as prevalent in Brown’s letters as those to other French thinkers, Brown’s own legal training, his participation in the Friendly Club with lawyers such as William Wood Wilkins and James Kent, and Montesquieu’s pervasive influence in US intellectual life—he was “[t]he most often praised and cited of the major French figures” (May 40) and, in the words of Peter Gay, “the most influential writer of the eighteenth century” (325)—make it exceedingly likely that Brown was familiar with Montesquieu’s work and his general influence on political thought in the eighteenth century.¹²

In fact, internal evidence in Brown’s fiction from the period reveals a marked familiarity with Montesquieu’s ideas, specifically his sociological framework for assessing different societies and their system of government. For instance, in *Alcuin: A Dialogue* (1798), which Brown wrote just before *Ormond*, the eponymous character responds to a critique of the Constitution and the political exclusions it sanctions—particularly for women, free blacks, and the poor—with the following statement:

In this representation . . . it must be allowed there is some truth; but do you sufficiently distinguish between *the form and spirit of a government*? The true condition of a nation cannot be described in a few words; nor can it be found in *the volumes of their laws*. We know little or nothing when our knowledge extends no further than the forms of the constitution. (25; emphasis added)

This patently Montesquieuan notion indicates Brown’s awareness that underlying a nation’s form (i.e., its “nature”) and its particular laws is a host of other phenomena—manners, mores, geography, climate—all of which contribute to its overarching “spirit.” In a similar vein, *Ormond* opens with its narrator, Sophia Courtland, writing to the forever-offscreen I. E. Rosenberg (the novel is, in fact, wholly composed of Sophia’s letter to Rosenberg). “Society and manners constitute your favorite study,” she mentions to him, and she thus suggests that her depiction of America’s “modes of life” will, she believes, “supply you with knowledge, on these heads, not to be otherwise obtained” (4). In other words, part of the value of *Ormond*—

advertised in its opening lines—is the opportunity it offers readers for undertaking the same kind of comparative political and cultural analysis that informed Montesquieu’s work.

It is exactly this capacity that Constantia Dudley seeks to cultivate in the novel. Despite the myriad dangers of Philadelphia, she not only continues her morning walks and observations but—more significantly—she persists in trying to quench her “ardent thirst of knowledge” (22) and to cultivate her numerous intellectual and artistic faculties. She plays music with her father (21), writes to her friends (20), purchases “what books her scanty stock would allow,” and indulges in “[h]er chief employment”—conversing on art, society, “the moral history of mankind” (21), and “the principles and progress of human society” (26). Yet this emphasis on individual development has largely been overlooked in recent criticism of the novel. Eager to distinguish between the “radical” and “conservative” ideas and characters in *Ormond*, scholars have largely reduced the novel’s politics to a progressive embrace of communitarian ideas. Philip Barnard and Stephen Shapiro, for instance, note the novel’s criticism of “the cultivation of individual interests” and its celebration of “the politics of collective and mutually beneficial organization” (xxxii) while Julia Stern similarly lauds the novel’s criticism of male figures who are incapable of “fellow feeling and, by extension, communal understanding” (161). These communitarian impulses are always diametrically opposed to the “liberal ideology of individualism,” which, for such critics, leads “to perversions of the self and corruption of the society” (Davidson 217), often because, in this view of Brown’s fiction (and in criticism of American literature more generally), liberalism is predominantly associated with economic self-interest (see Watts) and “political alienation” (see Morris).¹³

But to view *Ormond* as critical of “the cultivation of individual interests” is to miss essential aspects of virtually all of its characters, particularly Constantia, who, as we just saw, does not allow her penurious living conditions to keep her from cultivating her intellect, friendships, or artistic capacities. While ardently committed to helping others, Constantia is also highly individualistic. “She had no intercourse,” we are told, “which necessity did not prescribe, with the rest of the world,” and she explicitly avoids “intercourse with prying and loquacious neighbors” (24) because she “set too much value upon time willingly to waste it upon trifles and triflers” (24–25). Instead, she prefers to explore “the poet and the moralist” (25).

Yet her “love of privacy” and her proclivity for scholarly reclusiveness do not leave her isolated. “Social pleasures,” we are told, “were precious to her heart, and she was not backward to form fellowships and friendships, with those around her” (135). “Her chief employment,” after all, is “conversation” (21)—conversation that connects her not only to other individuals but also to the imaginatively expansive worlds of art, history, politics, and morality.

In other words, there is no easy split between individualism and communitarianism in *Ormond*.¹⁴ Individual cultivation is both lauded and inherently linked to—and in many ways reliant on—one’s connection to the broader community in a complex dynamic that is both public and private.¹⁵ And it is amid the broader community of characters that Constantia’s individual development proceeds. Both she and Martinette share a political sensibility that is, as we have seen, perhaps the most celebrated character trait in *Ormond*, and their quickly progressing friendship helps Constantia discover new horizons of thought and experience. Prior to meeting Martinette, Constantia’s “attention had been chiefly occupied by personal concerns” and, though she is aware of world events, “[h]er views and her inferences on this head, were general and speculative” (142). But her conversations with the worldly Martinette help her transcend the parochialism of her Philadelphia world. Martinette has lived a singularly cosmopolitan existence: born in Aleppo to a Greek mother and a “Sclavonian” father (144), she has spent time in places such as Spain, Tuscany, France, and England closely observing their “government and manners.” And in a truly remarkable feat of political experience, she has fought in *both* the American and French Revolutions.¹⁶ Her “large experience, vigorous faculties and masculine attainments” (141) thus provide significant sources of inspiration and insight to Constantia, whose mind “was always kept at the pitch of curiosity and wonder” (142) as new horizons of experience emerge into her view.

Yet even more significant are Constantia’s conversations with Ormond, the novel’s most mysterious and intriguing figure. “The conversation of Ormond,” we are told, “was an inexhaustible fund. By the variety of topics and the excitements to reflection it supplied, a more plenteous influx of knowledge was produced, than could have flowed from any other source” (130). Once again, manners and customs play a prominent role in such narratives as Ormond “recounted the perils of a Russian war, and *painted the manners* of Mongals and Naudowessies” (157; emphasis added). Echoing

the logic and literary motifs of *The Federalist*, Ormond links “the excitements to reflection” (130) such tales provide Constantia with the novel’s pronounced emphasis on *space*. “Ormond’s narratives had carried her,” we are told, “beyond the Mississippi, and into the deserts of Siberia.” As a result, Constantia’s “prospect of mankind seemed to be enlarged, on a sudden, to double its ancient dimensions” (157).

In fact, Ormond is often described with language that associates his very existence with spatial expansiveness and vastness of scale. His “uncommon energy” occupies “a wide sphere of action” (87) and his enigmatic political “projects” are “diffused over an ample space” (88). Constantia recognizes that his mind is “habituated to profound and extensive views” and that all of “[h]is associations were formed on a comprehensive scale” (117). It is almost surprising to find Ormond existing in any one place in the narrative at a given time, for everything about him seems to occupy a far grander plane of existence. Yet like so many elements of the mysterious gothic world of the novel, Ormond is not what he seems. And as the novel progresses, it is his character that, despite his worldly experience, most clearly evinces the “spirit” of despotism and the tensions that always reside in attempting to navigate, in cosmopolitan fashion, the imaginative terrain between the local and the general.

“SELF-OBLIVIOUS BENEVOLENCE”:

SOPHIA COURTLAND, *MÈDIOCRITÉ*, AND
THE ETHICAL PRIORITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

“Ormond will, perhaps, appear to you a contradictory or unintelligible being” (Brown, *Ormond* 4), Sophia Courtland mentions to I. E. Rosenberg at the outset of the novel, and she later admits that, “I know no task more arduous than a just delineation of the character of Ormond” (83). And yet in her opinion, “Ormond was, of all mankind, the being most difficult *and most deserving* to be studied” (84; emphasis added). What makes Ormond warrant such close scrutiny? His inherently mysterious nature, of course, provides the novel’s characters with a constant temptation toward further inquiry. But it is his involvement in “political projects,” which “are likely to possess an extensive influence on the future condition of this western world” (84), that demands, in Sophia’s mind, such vigilance. Attesting once again to the importance of politics and political thought in the eighteenth-

century world of the novel, Ormond’s political projects and—perhaps more importantly—the ideas that inform them draw Sophia and Constantia into their most significant, demanding, and dangerous interpretive tasks.

Indicating the portentousness of Ormond’s political ideas, Sophia professes that “I had always believed the character and machinations of Ormond to be worthy of caution and fear” (201). In fact, it is Sophia who, in the closing chapters of the novel, steps forth as the capable political analyst in order to diagnose the flawed—and fundamentally perilous—principles that undergird Ormond’s political philosophy. And it is Sophia’s own cosmopolitan ethos and worldly experience that enables her to do so. Since at least William Hedges’s 1974 essay on the novel, critics of *Ormond* have largely viewed Sophia—not Ormond—as the true controlling presence in the narrative. In this view, Sophia attempts to regulate and proscribe any ideological deviations from her commitment to “sentimental virtue” (118). Similarly, for Robert Levine, Sophia symbolizes “the political will to eliminate opposing others,” even violently, if necessary (47). Critics therefore often repudiate her “conservative” politics and her allegedly “nativist, territorial, and provincial” (Barnard and Shapiro xliii) worldview, instead favoring Martinette’s more radical sensibility (Barnard and Shapiro xliii; Stern 227; Lewis).¹⁷ But, for starters, Sophia’s political views are in no way “provincial.” Like Ormond and Martinette, she has had a remarkably cosmopolitan upbringing, “travers[ing] every part of France, Switzerland and Italy” (Brown, *Ormond* 175) as well as England, places where she witnessed “the progress of the mighty revolution” and its influence on affairs “over the face of the neighboring kingdoms” (175–76). Her political sensibilities and convictions therefore have, as Brown puts it, “the sanction of experience” (194)—and a patently *broad* experience at that.

Moreover, like Martinette and Ormond, Sophia is also an accomplished observer of “government and manners.” In a passage often derided by critics but, when properly situated in its eighteenth-century intellectual context, more accurately seen as indicating her acute political sensibilities, Sophia details her dawning political awareness on returning to the United States for the first time since her early childhood:

I marked the peculiarities of manners and language in my new abode, and studied the effects which a political and religious system, so opposite to that with which I had conversed, in Italy and Switzerland, had

produced. I found that the difference between Europe and America, lay chiefly in this; that, in the former, all things tended to extremes, whereas, in the latter, all things tended to the same level. Genius and virtue, and happiness, on these shores, were distinguished by a sort of mediocrity. Conditions were less unequal, and men were strangers to the heights of enjoyment and the depths of misery, to which the inhabitants of Europe are accustomed. (182)

For *Ormond* scholars, this passage is clear evidence of Sophia's conservative beliefs.¹⁸ But by now, the echoes of Montesquieu's political sociology—the emphasis on “manners and language,” “political and religious system[s],” “[g]enius and virtue”—should be readily apparent, and we must therefore widen our lens beyond associations with conservative rhetoric to take in the broader political comparison taking place here.

In fact, the passage is almost a direct paraphrase of Montesquieu in book 5, chapter 3 of *The Spirit of the Laws* where he discusses the nature of virtue in a democracy. “[D]istinctions in a democracy,” he writes, “arise from the principle of equality” (43), unlike in monarchies and despotisms, in which “everyone aims for superiority” (44). The result is that, in Thomas Nugent's translation of *The Spirit of the Laws*, “[t]he good sense and happiness of individuals depend greatly upon *the mediocrity of their abilities and fortunes*” (45; emphasis added).¹⁹ Here “mediocrity” (*mèdiocritè*) does not mean “unimpressive,” but something more like “existing harmoniously between extremes,” a clear distinction from the monarchical goal of achieving superiority over others. In fact, for Montesquieu, such a desire for superiority can easily engender “the idea of conquest,” which all too easily “allows deceit when deceit is added to the idea of greatness of spirit or greatness of business, as in politics, whose niceties do not offend it” (Montesquieu, *Spirit* 32). In other words, a desire to distinguish oneself can quickly devolve into an unrelenting “conquest” requiring deception and cunning—the very traits that, as we will see, govern the attitudes, ideas, and ends of *Ormond*.

Properly positioned in her eighteenth-century context, Sophia should be seen not as the novel's voice of “counterrevolutionary” (see Barnard and Shapiro xli–xlv) or “countersubversive” (Levine 40) rhetoric, but as the novel's most Montesquieuian analyst of the relations between systems of government and the deeper “spirit” that powers their underlying man-

ners, mores, and customs. In comparing the United States with “Italy,” “Switzerland,” and “Europe” as a whole, Sophia is not merely comparing the American and French Revolutions or the clash between revolutionary and “counterrevolutionary” attitudes but the more general differences between republican forms of government and those of monarchy and despotism—distinctions that were paramount for Montesquieu and, as we saw, for Madison, Hamilton, and Jay as they contemplated the appropriate system of government for America and, in both their words and Sophia’s, the “[g]enius and virtue” that informed the daily life of its citizens.

And it is this kind of analysis and political sensibility that informs Sophia’s critique of the “spirit” guiding both Ormond’s wide-ranging political projects and his more localized obsession with Constantia, who, in his mind, “was to be obtained by any means” (Brown, *Ormond* 132). Neither “project” can be said to embody *médiocrité*. Ormond’s tyrannical desire to possess Constantia, which leads him to arrange what he calls the “benevolent” (213) murder of her father and which will prompt his attempted rape of Constantia in the novel’s final scenes, embodies, in horrifyingly nefarious form, the idea of “conquest” that Montesquieu denounced. On a more patently political level, Ormond’s travels to “Constantinople and Berlin,” Sophia informs us, have brought him into contact “with schemers and reasoners, who aimed at the new-modelling of the world, and the subversion of all that has hitherto been conceived elementary and fundamental, in the constitution of man and government” (193). Such phrasing contains echoes of Publius’s criticism of “[u]topian speculations” (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 104) and “[t]heoretic politicians” (126) who ignored the lessons that human history and human experience had to offer, and the “dangerous ambition” that is “a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism” than a “well-informed judgment” regarding the kind of government that should be instituted among a people (89). In other words, while Ormond’s machinations may, from his own perspective, be associated with notions of progress and “benevolence,” their “spirit” is clearly more aligned with the institutions and attitudes of despotism.²⁰

Like Montesquieu and Publius, Sophia fears such principles. “I had seen too much of innovation and imposture, in France and Italy,” she remarks, “not to regard a man like this, with aversion and fear.” She is particularly concerned about Constantia’s “unsuspicious” orientation toward Ormond—the result, Sophia believes, of having “lived at a distance from

scenes, where principles are hourly put to the test of experiment” (Brown, *Ormond* 194). In other words, Constantia’s too-recent embrace of cosmopolitanism has left her vulnerable to Ormond’s despotic tendencies. On the novel’s spectrum of cosmopolitan sensibilities, Constantia lingers too close to local circumstances, while Ormond, it seems, has gone too far toward critical detachment. Neither inherently conservative nor radical (at least according to our present understanding of such terms), Sophia occupies an analytic middle ground—a *médiocrité*—that is the very heart of the cosmopolitan ideal.

But perhaps the most revealing and complex critique Sophia offers about Ormond is her criticism that his quixotic plans for total social transformation are based on “systems of all-embracing and self-oblivious benevolence” (194). “Self-oblivious benevolence” is an odd phrase, and the first thing to notice is that it is *not* synonymous with “selflessness”—the virtuous individual behavior held in high esteem in *Ormond*. Rather, it is a term of opprobrium for Sophia, who sees “self-oblivious benevolence” as a terrible flaw in a system of thought about the social world, not a trait one exhibits in acting locally on behalf of another. To be oblivious of the self in one’s plans for “benevolent” reform is to assert, inflexibly, the absolute priority of “the good of mankind” (194). This is, undoubtedly, a noble ideal that is, on some level, an essential element of all political philosophy. But so, too, can “the good of mankind” be an abstraction to which the rights, well-being, and even lives of many concrete individuals on a local level might be sacrificed. To exhibit “self-oblivious benevolence” is to assert a moral imperative that ignores the very foundation of that morality: the individual, whose security and capacity for “honorable self-assertion” lie at the heart of democratic life and its commitment to ensuring that “one citizen cannot fear another citizen.”

In fact, it is the very ethical centrality of the individual that Ormond wants to surreptitiously, and despotically, negate, for, as Sophia perceives:

Ormond aspired to nothing more ardently than to hold the reins of opinion. To exercise *absolute power* over the conduct of others, not by constraining their limbs, or by exacting obedience to his authority, but in a way of which his subjects should be scarcely conscious. He desired that his guidance should controul [sic] their steps, but that his agency, when most effectual, should be least suspected. (131; emphasis added)

In his pursuit of superiority and “absolute power”—in a word, despotism—Ormond looks to control others not only physically (as in the case of Constantia) but mentally, through a rigid grasp on the “reins of opinion.” By taking away the ability for others to reflect and deliberate for themselves, he has removed the essential elements of honorable self-assertion. All are reduced to this same level for Ormond, calling to mind Montesquieu’s famous comparison between republican and despotic government: “Men are equal in republican government; they are equal in despotic government; in the former, it is because they are everything; in the latter, it is because they are nothing” (*Spirit* 75). On both the local and more distant planes of the novel’s narrative space, Ormond’s “self-oblivious benevolence” exhibits a hyperrational disposition at odds with immediate reality and untethered from the important connection that a truly cosmopolitan view must maintain with local realities.

The result of that despotic vision is the negation of the moral value of the individual—a vision most terrifyingly manifested in Ormond’s attempt to rape Constantia. As Robert Levine argues, “[t]he threat of rape literalizes the notion of constitution” (47), and thus, just as we saw in the novel’s opening scenes with Constantia’s symbolic walks on “the State-house Mall,” the very idea of political origins and foundations registers in the novel’s final scene of gothic violence. Yet in a rewriting of the traditional seduction novel, Constantia refuses “virtuous” suicide and defends herself, killing Ormond with a pen knife. It is a radical act of womanly self-assertion in the era’s fiction. Paul Lewis insightfully links this scene with Martinette’s earlier recounting of her revolutionary adventures—particularly her proclamation, “My hand never faltered when liberty demanded the victim” (Brown, *Ormond* 158)—and persuasively argues that Constantia’s radical decision to defend herself is the direct influence of Martinette’s idealistic heroism, which has “prepared her to act” in self-defense (Lewis 49). But so, too, is it the direct influence of Sophia, whose repudiation of “self-oblivious benevolence” and assertion of the value of individual well-being provides a far deeper moral justification for Constantia’s act than Martinette’s bold and defiant example. In fact, Martinette’s killings in the name of liberty might be said to possess a frightening similarity to Ormond’s twisted worldview, for she, too, does not hesitate to sacrifice individuals to larger schemes of “benevolence,” indicating what Peter Kafer calls her pronounced lack of “fellow feeling” (165) and her own

markedly despotic tendencies. And the final revelation that Martinette is Ormond's sister only affirms their symbolic connection.

Yet we miss important aspects of such a connection—particularly the political content it harbors—when our interpretations of political novels such as *Ormond* are guided solely by the imperatives to critique “conservative” ideas or characters and to unearth “radical” or “revolutionary” elements for celebration and emulation. Those imperatives will always be essential tools for the critic. But as political theorist Alessandro Ferrara has recently reminded us, “revolutionary politics . . . may or may not be an instance of politics at its best” (40). While there is much to celebrate in a figure such as Martinette, there is also much that should give us pause. And while there might be aspects of Sophia Courtland's character that concern us, so, too, are there elements worthy of emulation.

When we dig deeper into the traditions of political thought that were so influential to US writers, new dimensions of early American literature reveal themselves. For thinkers such as Montesquieu, Publius, and their literary descendant Charles Brockden Brown, understanding social life required a keen perception of the way in which political institutions and social habits were dynamically related. To foster one kind of attitude, habit, or “spirit” over another could mean the difference between providing fertile ground for a democratic polity and encouraging a more despotic form of governance—perhaps one befitting the genre of gothic fiction. None of this means that we need to put aside our contemporary desire for political progress. To do so would be, among other things, to abandon the very spirit of a novel such as *Ormond*. But we should do our best to ensure that those desires do not obscure our understanding of the past and the role of politics and political ideas in it. As Montesquieu, Publius, and Brown show us, a close attention to political and social life is essential to the project of advancing liberty, equality, and a more perfect political union—a project that we can only hope to continue forwarding in our own time if we both care for *and* care about history.

NOTES

1. Prominent studies in this critical history include Nelson, *National Manhood* and *Commons Democracy*; Burgett; Castronovo, *Necro Citizenship*; Castronovo and Nelson; Dillon; Loughran; and Castiglia. For a challenge to the idea of democratic passivity, see Gustafson, *Imagining* 10.

2. As Slauter points out, “The modern analytic meaning of the word ‘culture’ would not be entirely lost on late eighteenth-century speakers and writers, but it is not their word” (11). In what follows, I want to emphasize the important differences between modern conceptions of “culture”—which typically concern the role of class, gender, race, sexual orientation, and other social phenomena in structures of power—and eighteenth-century writers’ concerns with “manners, morals, beliefs, opinions, customs, genius, and taste” (Slauter 11).
3. Emphasizing the dispositional nature of cosmopolitanism, Anderson writes, “Cosmopolitanism is an advocated ideal, not a fully assumable identity” (*Way We Argue* 92n25).
4. In *The Way We Argue Now* (2006) and *Bleak Liberalism* (2016), Anderson largely emphasizes twentieth-century thinkers such as Lionel Trilling, Theodore Adorno, and Jürgen Habermas, though John Stuart Mill and John Dewey are important nineteenth-century touchpoints for both her and Gustafson (*Imagining, “Equality as Singularity”*).
5. Downes’s scrupulous and incisive study of Hobbes achieves a number of important recoveries for literary scholars, one of which is the way that the “surplus” (3) of Hobbesian sovereignty troubles classic accounts of the role of representation in a democratic community (see esp. 61). By attending to the impact of Montesquieu and Publius on Brown, I hope to shed light on a dynamic of liberal democracy that Downes’s negative, and somewhat monolithic, portrayal of “a liberal-Protestant model of capitalist social organization” (4) might dismiss too quickly. Madison’s reliance on “a wisdom and virtue that precedes the communal event of election and representation” (Downes 163) is a tenuous one and is fundamentally at odds with his philosophical skepticism, where even the words of “the Almighty himself” would be “rendered dim and doubtful” (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 245) because of humanity’s limited perceptual and communicative faculties. *Ormond*, I argue, dramatizes those Madisonian doubts by representing both the importance *and the limits of* the cosmopolitan ideal for liberal democracy.
6. I thank Robert Faulkner for his insights on Montesquieu and US political thought in his response to an earlier draft of this essay.
7. My emphasis on Publius’s spatial tropes parallels what Ellison has called “the poetics of the prospect” (101) in early republican poetry.
8. My reading of *The Federalist* therefore bears important similarities to that of Burt, who emphasizes the importance of “worldliness” in Publius’s conception of civic engagement, particularly for political representatives. To the extent that my reading differs from Burt’s, it is in my more pronounced focus on the capacities of the average citizen (rather than the elected representative) and the comparative assessment of political systems and practices that figure in Publius’s thought.
9. The historiographical debate over alleged differences between liberalism and republicanism is, of course, endlessly complex and a thorough overview would detract from the objectives of this article. Useful overviews of the debates can be found in Kloppenberg; Burgett; Ericson; and Hulliung.

10. As historian Sean Wilentz argues, “to impose current categories of democracy on the past is to block any understanding of how our own, more elevated standards originated” (xviii).
11. For an examination of the political context informing Brown’s gothicism, see Kafer. On the epidemic’s range of symbolic associations in the novel, see Barnard and Shapiro xxxix–xli; Levine; Kafer 160–65; Watts; and Stern 153–238.
12. As Gay points out, “Diderot’s *Encyclopédie*, which enlists Montesquieu among its most distinguished contributors, did much to disseminate his ideas” (325). For Brown’s interest in and engagement with the *Encyclopédie*, see Verhoeven as well as Brown’s letters to Joseph Bringham, Jr., on May 30 and June 10, 1792 (Brown, *Collected Writings* 109–13, 124–26).
13. See also Drexler and White, who analyze the republican “fantasy” of “economic success”—a forerunner of “the American Dream” (340)—in *Ormond*. Drexler and White do not offer a substantive definition of “republican” in their article, but the emphasis on economic individualism evinces the similarity of their approach to others that more explicitly invoke liberalism.
14. For a critical account of a liberal-communitarian split in modern philosophical debates, see Ryan (especially chapter 4).
15. *Ormond* thus pushes against the “desire for recognition” central to Dillon’s Althusserian conception of liberalism’s public-private divide (6).
16. See Lewis, who argues that Martinette’s revolutionary experiences were, in fact, quite common during the era.
17. For a slightly different take on Sophia that highlights Brown’s unique use of a female narrator, see Stern. See also Kafer, one of the few scholars to point out that Martinette “is not an appealing figure for Brown” (165).
18. In particular, see Barnard and Shapiro’s footnote to this passage in Brown, *Ormond* (182n4). See also Levine 47–49.
19. Montesquieu’s original French is: “Le bon sens et le bonheur des particuliers consiste beaucoup dans la médiocrité de leurs talents et de leurs fortunes” (*Esprit* 38). I therefore refer to what I believe is Nugent’s more accurate rendering (so long as we acknowledge eighteenth-century English usage) of *médiocrité*, which Cohler, Miller, and Stone translate with the more modern term *middling* (Montesquieu, *Spirit* 44).
20. For a challenge to the idea that Publius is, himself, a “counterrevolutionary,” see Ackerman 200–01.

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